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Improving quantum secret-sharing schemes
Anderson C. A. Nascimento, Joern Mueller-Quade, and Hideki Imai
Third Department, Institute of Industrial Science, The University of Tokyo, Tokyo 153-8505, Japan
共Received 21 February 2001; published 17 September 2001兲
We propose a protocol that enables a dealer to share a quantum secret with n players using less than n
quantum shares for several access structures. For threshold schemes we derived an expression that shows how
many quantum shares can be saved in this scheme. Also, several features that are available for classical
secret-sharing schemes 共and previously not known to be possible for quantum secret-sharing兲 become available
with this protocol.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevA.64.042311

PACS number共s兲: 03.67.Dd

I. INTRODUCTION

Secret-sharing schemes were independently introduced by
Shamir 关1兴 and Blakley 关2兴 in 1979. They are fundamental
building blocks of multiparty computation protocols 关3兴, unconditionally secure key distribution 关4兴, digital signature
schemes 关5兴, as well as of key management schemes 关6兴. In a
classical secret-sharing scheme, a dealer shares a secret by
distributing pieces of information among a set of players in a
way, that only authorized subsets of the players’ set will be
able to recover the secret. Recently, this concept was generalized to the quantum scenario. In 关7兴 Hillery et al. proposed
a scheme where an unknown qubit can be shared with two
players, such that to recover the original qubit the players
have to put their pieces of quantum information together. In
关8兴 Cleve, Gottesman, and Lo presented a more general
scheme where a dealer can share an unknown quantum state
with a set of players in a way that only authorized groups of
players can recover the original secret and collusions of unauthorized players cannot get any information about it. The
construction in 关8兴 was based on quantum error-correcting
codes. A construction for general access structures based on
monotone span programs was presented in 关9兴 by Smith.
Differently than quantum key exchange and other quantum cryptographic protocols such as quantum bit commitment, the main aim of quantum secret sharing is not to
achieve a level of security that is impossible in the classical
world. Rather, the aim is to share a different kind of data: an
unknown quantum state. If quantum computers become a
reality, quantum secret sharing could possibly play an important role in distributed quantum secure computations.
In classical secure multiparty computations, several computers interconnected by a network want to compute the
value of a function, which depends on secret inputs of all the
players. Some users might collude to cheat in the protocol as
to obtain information about the secret inputs of other players
or to modify the result of the computation. In a quantum
version of a secure multiparty computation, a group of users
would like to compute a quantum state by inputting quantum
as well as classical data in a way that no allowed collusion of
cheaters can get any information about the inputs of other
players or alter the result of the computation.
A fundamental issue when dealing with secret-sharing
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schemes is the amount of data that must be given to the set of
players. The smaller the amount of data given to the set of
players the better. This issue becomes even more important
when dealing with quantum secret sharing. As quantum data
is expansive and hard to deal with, it would be desirable to
use as little quantum data as possible in order to share an
unknown quantum state. In this paper we show that quantum
data and classical data can be used together in a hybrid quantum secret-sharing scheme in order to reduce the amount of
quantum data that has to be distributed to the players. As
classical data is much easier to store, transmit, and receive,
this result significantly improves the viability of quantum
secret-sharing schemes.
It is interesting to note that, in this case, classical data
help one to perform a completely quantum task. This is not
the case with data compression 关10兴 or with the quantum
capacity of a quantum channel 关11兴. In 关11兴 Adami and Cerf
proved that a classical forward channel connecting two parties cannot increase the capacity of a quantum channel between them. In 关10兴 Barnum et al. proved that no part of the
quantum-information content of a quantum source can be
faithfully replaced by classical information.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II we introduce
our notations and give some preliminaries. In Sec. III we
state our main results and in Sec. IV we introduce features of
quantum secret-sharing schemes that become available with
our results. Finally, in Sec. V we give our conclusions.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Classical secret-sharing schemes

As stated in Sec. I, a secret-sharing scheme is a protocol
that enables a dealer D to share a secret S with a set of
players P so that the members of an authorized group will be
able to recover S, but no other members can get any information about the secret S. The authorized groups will be
defined by an access structure ⌫, a family where each element is an authorized group. The secret-sharing scheme will
be called perfect if 共1兲 each set listed in ⌫ can recover the
secret S with absolute certainty, and 共2兲 none of the subsets
not listed in ⌫ can get any information about the secret S.
When 兩 P兩 ⫽w and ⌫⫽ 兵 B債P: 兩 B 兩 ⭓t 其 we say we have a
(t,w)-threshold scheme.
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B. Quantum error-correction codes and quantum secret
sharing

In 关8兴 Cleve, Gottesman, and Lo introduced the notion of
quantum threshold schemes. It was based on quantum erasure correction 关12–15兴. In an 关 n,k 兴 quantum errorcorrecting code, a quantum state 兩 X 典 苸H k 共where H k is the
k-dimensional Hilbert space兲 is associated with another vector 兩  典 苸H n called a codeword, where n⭓k. The set of all
codewords is a linear subspace X債 H n with dim X⫽k. Let
U be a unitary transformation that represents the action of the
environment introducing errors in a quantum state 兩  典
苸H n . If these errors are local errors, the action of this unitary operator U on the quantum state 兩  典 苸H n can be expanded in terms of 兵 I,X,Y ,Z 其 丢 n , where X,Y and Z are the
three Pauli operators.
Therefore, we have that in H n the errors can be represented by tensor-products operators, E ␣ ⫽ 丢 1⭐ j⭐n ␣ j , where
␣ ⫽( ␣ 1 , ␣ 2 , . . . , ␣ n ), ␣ j 苸 兵 I,X,Y ,Z 其 . The number of ␣ j
⫽I in a word ␣ will denote the weight of ␣ and will be
represented by w( ␣ ). A quantum code X is called E-error
correcting if ᭙ ␣ , ␤ with w( ␣ ),w( ␤ )⭐E and for ᭙  , 
苸X,

具  E ␣ 兩 E ␤  典 ⫽ 具  兩 E ␣ E ␤ 兩  典 ⫽b ␣ , ␤ 具  兩  典 ,

b ␣ , ␤ 苸C

if additionally, b ␣ , ␤ ⫽0, unless ␣ ⫽ ␤ , the code is said to be
nondegenerate. It is important to remark that ␣ and ␤ are
independent of 具  兩  典 . It is a well-known result that an
E-error-correcting quantum code can correct 2E erasures.
The minimum distance of a code can be defined as the
minimum number of undetected errors. An 关 n,k 兴 code with
minimum distance d is referred as an 关 n,k,d 兴 code. Cleve,
Gottesman, and Lo exploited the fact that if we trace over
any n⫺t subset of qubits of a codeword 兩  典 苸 H n in an
关 n,k,d 兴 code with d⫽t⫺1, we have that

 (t) ⫽tr(n⫺t) 兩  典具  兩 ⫽

1
2t

I

is the complete mixture. Therefore, by measuring any subset
of dimension smaller or equal to t⫺1, it is impossible to get
any information about the complete state 兩  典 . This is a consequence of the fact that any information extracted out of a
quantum state implies disturbance of the state. Therefore, if
we want to protect a quantum state composed of n qubits
from errors in any subset of k qubits, we have to ensure that
any measurement performed 共maybe by the environment兲 on
any subset of k qubits will get no information about the state.
It follows that in order to implement a (t,w) quantum threshold secret-sharing scheme, we must have a 关 2t⫺1,1,t 兴 quantum code 关8兴.
It is interesting to note that not all access structures can be
implemented by quantum secret-sharing schemes. This restriction comes from the no-cloning theorem 关16兴. This theorem states that it is impossible to clone with perfect fidelity
an unknown quantum state. Therefore, any access structure
that has two disjoints subsets cannot be implemented. In another paper 关17兴, Gottesman generalized the results obtained

for threshold schemes to general access structures. It was
stated in 关17兴 that in a quantum secret-sharing scheme, the
size of the shares must be at least that of the secret to be
shared and all the important players must receive one quantum share.

C. Encryption of qubits

In the next section we show how to overcome this limitation by use of an interesting tool proposed in 关18兴: the
encryption of quantum bits, which is briefly reviewed in this
section. The encryption scheme works as follows: suppose
we have a quantum state 兩  典 composed of n qubits and a
random sequence of 2n classical bits, each pair of classical
bits is associated with a qubit and it determines which transformation  苸 兵 I,X,Y ,Z 其 is applied to the respective qubit. If
the pair is 00, I is applied, if it is 01, X is applied, and so on.
It is easy to see that if  is chosen at random from 兵 I,X,Y ,Z 其
the resulting state 兩 ˜ 典 is the complete mixture and no information can be extracted out of it. However, if someone
knows the classical sequence of bits, the sequence of operators that were applied to 兩  典 is known and, as they are unitary transformations, they can be reversed and 兩  典 can be
recovered. Therefore, classical data can be used to encrypt
quantum data.
III. IMPROVING QUANTUM SECRET-SHARING
SCHEMES

In this section we show how to improve quantum secretsharing schemes, in terms of reducing the number of necessary quantum shares, by using quantum encryption. First, we
give an example: suppose we want to share a quantum secret
兩 S 典 with a set of players P⫽ 兵 A,B,C,D,E 其 realizing an access structure ⌫⫽ 兵 (A,B,C),(A,D),(A,E) 其 . If we encrypt
the quantum state 兩 S 典 共using a classical key K) into another
quantum state 兩 S̃ 典 using the method described in Sec. II C
and give 兩 S̃ 典 to the player A, we can share the classical key
by a classical secret-sharing scheme that realizes ⌫. The
player A cannot recover 兩 S 典 from 兩 S̃ 典 because he does not
have the key. Only the subsets present in ⌫ can recover the
classical key and the encrypted state together. By using this
hybrid 共classic-quantum兲 secret-sharing scheme, we can realize the access structure ⌫ by giving quantum data plus
some classical data to the player A, and only classical data to
all the other players. This has some advantageous features;
for example, classical data is much easier to store, transmit,
and receive than quantum data. However, not all the access
structures can be improved in this way. For example, if we
analyze a (2,3)-secret-sharing scheme, we realize that there
is no way to distribute quantum data to only some members
of the set of players. We now give a definition of improvable
secret-sharing schemes.
Definition 1. A quantum secret-sharing scheme realizing
an access structure ⌫⫽ 兵 A 1 ,A 2 , . . . ,A r 其 among a set of
players P⫽ 兵 P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n 其 is improvable if less than n
quantum shares are sufficient to implement it.
The following theorem answers the question of when a
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quantum secret-sharing scheme realizing a given access
structure can be improved.
Theorem 1. For a conventional quantum secret-sharing
scheme realizing an access structure ⌫⫽ 兵 A 1 ,A 2 , . . . ,A r 其
among a set of players P⫽ 兵 P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n 其 , it is ‘‘improvable’’ if there exists at least one P i 苸A j 苸⌫, 1⭐ j⭐r such
that ⌫ 兩 P⫺ P i does not violate the no-cloning theorem, where
⌫ 兩 P⫺ P i denotes the restriction of ⌫ to P⫺ P i .
Proof. If ⌫ 兩 P⫺ P i does not violate the no-cloning theorem,
there exists a quantum secret-sharing scheme that realizes
⌫ 兩 P⫺ P i . We can implement a hybrid scheme realizing ⌫ in
the following way: we encrypt the shares of ⌫ 兩 P⫺ P i with a
classical key K and share it using a classical secret-sharing
scheme realizing ⌫. As ⌫ is a monotone access structure, the
existence of a classical secret-sharing scheme implementing
⌫ is easily proved by using any of the well-known construction techniques for monotone access structures present in the
literature 共such as 关19兴兲. All the sets in ⌫ 兩 P⫺ P i can recover
the encrypted shares, but only the sets in ⌫ can recover the
encrypted shares and the classical key together.
䊏
Now we formalize the notion of minimal and optimal
restricted-access structure.
Definition 2. A realizable restriction of an access structure
⌫⫽ 兵 A 1 ,A 2 , . . . ,A r 其 to a subset B債P⫽ 兵 P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n 其 is
a family ⌫ 兩 B ⫽ˆ兵 A i 艚B 其 :A i 苸⌫‰ that satisfies the no-cloning
theorem, and B艚A i ⫽⭋, ᭙A i 苸⌫. ⌫ 兩 B is called minimal if
it is not improvable, and it is optimal if there is no other
D債P such that ⌫ 兩 D is minimal and 兩 D 兩 ⬍ 兩 B 兩 .
We now give a protocol that implements an improved
quantum secret-sharing scheme among a set of players P
⫽ 兵 P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n 其 , realizing an access structure ⌫ when its
realizable minimal restriction ⌫ 兩 B is known. In this improved
scheme only 兩 B 兩 quantum shares are needed, instead of 兩 P兩 .
Distribution phase. 共1兲 Choose a random classical encryption K. Encrypt the quantum secret 兩 S 典 using the encryption
algorithm described in Sec. II C. The encrypted state will be
denoted 兩 S̃ 典 . 共2兲 Using a normal quantum secret-sharing
scheme, share 兩 S̃ 典 with the set of players realizing ⌫ 兩 B . Each
member of B will receive a quantum share 兩 Q i 典 , 1⭐i
⭐ 兩 B 兩 . 共3兲 Using a classical secret-sharing scheme share K
with the set of players realizing ⌫. Each member of P
⫽ 兵 P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n 其 will receive a classical share C j , 1⭐ j
⭐n.
Reconstruction phase. 共1兲 Collect the quantum shares
from the members of B. 共2兲 Collect the classical shares from
the members of P. 共3兲 Reconstruct the encrypted quantum
secret 兩 S̃ 典 and the classical key K. 共4兲 Decrypt 兩 S̃ 典 by using
K.
It is easy to see that the protocol described above shares a
quantum secret with a set of players so that only the groups
of players specified by ⌫ will have access to the quantum
secret. However, we have to note that it is not easy to compute the minimal access structure for a general access structure ⌫. This task can be made easier if ⌫ has certain symmetry. This is the case of an important class of access
structures: the so-called threshold schemes.

A. Threshold schemes

In order to find out this expression, we first state the following lemma.
Lemma 1. A restriction of a threshold scheme is always a
threshold scheme.
Proof. The proof of this lemma follows from the definition of threshold schemes.
The following lemma gives us the expression for the optimal restriction of a threshold scheme.
Lemma 2. If a (k,n)-threshold scheme does not violate
the no-cloning theorem, its minimal access structure is equal
to the optimal one. Moreover it is given by the expression
(k⫺ ␥ ,n⫺ ␥ ) where ␥ ⫽2k⫺n⫺1.
Proof. From lemma 1 we know that a restriction of a
threshold scheme is always a threshold scheme. Therefore, a
restriction of a (k,n)-threshold scheme must be of the form
(k⫺ ␥ ,n⫺ ␥ ) for an integer ␥ . From the no-cloning theorem
we know that k⫺ ␥ ⬎(n⫺ ␥ )/2⇒2k⫺n⬎ ␥ , so the minimal
䊏
restriction has ␥ ⫽2k⫺n⫺1.
Example 1. Suppose a threshold scheme (99,100). In a
conventional quantum secret-sharing realization of this access structure, all the 100 players must receive a quantum
share that is as large as the secret to be shared. However,
from lemma 5 we know that its minimal restriction is a
(2,3)-threshold scheme. Therefore, we just need three quantum shares in order to implement a hybrid quantum secretsharing scheme realizing a quantum (99,100)-threshold
scheme. Following the same logic, we see that an
(n,n)-threshold scheme can be realized with only one quantum share.
B. General access structures

The analysis for general access structures is more complicated. We just improve a construction technique that was
presented in 关17兴. First, we remember a construction of general access structures from threshold secret-sharing schemes
proposed in 关19兴 by Benaloh and Leichter. It is based on
monotonic circuits. With each general access structure, Benaloh associated a special kind of boolean circuit called
monotonic circuit. Suppose we have a boolean circuit with
Boolean inputs, which represent the players, and one output
y. The basic idea is to have a circuit that recognizes an authorized group of users. It means that the output y will be 1
if an authorized group of players is used as the input of the
circuit. As the circuit is monotonic, changing one input from
1 to 0 does not change the output from 0 to 1 共excluding
members of an unauthorized group will not change it into an
authorized one兲. Afterwards, we could build up a secretsharing scheme from the description of the circuit. To ensure
the monotonicity of the circuit we will use only AND ()
and OR () gates.
Example 2. Following Benaloh’s representation, an access
structure ⌫⫽ 兵 (A,B,C),(A,D) 其 would be represented by the
circuit y⫽(ABC)(AD).
In a classical secret-sharing scheme, an access structure
can be realized by associating the AND gates with a
(q,q)-threshold scheme and the OR gates with a
(1,r)-threshold scheme. In the given example, (ABC)
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would be realized by a (3,3)-threshold scheme and the OR
would be realized by a (1,2)-threshold scheme. This construction does not directly apply to the quantum scenario
because (1,r) quantum threshold schemes do not exist for
r⭓2 due to the no-cloning theorem.
In 关17兴, Gottesman proved that the (1,r)-threshold
scheme can be substituted by an (r,2r⫺1)-threshold scheme
共a majority function兲. We earlier saw that an
(r,2r⫺1)-threshold scheme cannot be improved. However,
all the (q,q)-threshold schemes used to implement the logical AND can be substituted by a (1,1)-quantum secret-sharing
scheme plus a (q,q)-classical secret-sharing scheme. Therefore, we see that a large group of general access structures
can also be improved. However, it is clear that the improved
access structure achieved by this construction is not minimal
in general.
IV. FEATURES

Besides reducing the amount of quantum data that must
be given to the set of players in order to share a quantum
secret, another advantage of the hybrid quantum secretsharing schemes is that they make possible a straightforward
application of several features that are available for classical
secret-sharing schemes and are not yet known to be valid in
the quantum scenario. We briefly explain these features in
this section.
The security of an (k,n)-threshold scheme is ensured iff
an adversary is restricted to compromise less than k players
during the whole lifetime of the secret. This is a quite strong
assumption for long-term secrets. In order to cope with this
problem, Herzberg et al. proposed in 关20兴 a scheme where
the shares are periodically renewed without changing the secret. It is easy to see that this construction applies to our
hybrid secret-sharing scheme, therefore creating a proactive
quantum secret-sharing scheme. To do so, we just use a proactive secret-sharing scheme to share the classical key K, and
we periodically change the classical shares among the players. It is important to note that we still do not know whether
such a protocol exists or not in a pure quantum secretsharing scheme.
Another interesting scheme that becomes available in the
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hybrid scheme is secret sharing with prevention. In a
(k,n,p)-secret sharing with prevention scheme, any group of
p users can avoid all the other users to reconstructing the
secret. Obviously, this scheme supposes that the players send
their shares to a center in order to reconstruct it. This scheme
was proposed in 关21兴. It becomes available in the quantum
scenario in the same way as the proactive scheme, by applying it to the classical scheme used to share the key.
As a final example, we cite secret-sharing schemes with
disenrollment 关22兴. In this scheme, a player can be excluded
without setting a new scheme. We see that this scheme does
not directly apply to our hybrid scheme. However, if we
regard the players who will hold quantum shares as high
reliable ones and that they will not be excluded of the
scheme, it becomes implantable. However, only the players
who hold only classical data can be excluded. Other variations, like nonperfect secret-sharing schemes, gradual disclosure of a secret, among others can be achieved in the same
way.
V. CONCLUSIONS

We proposed a hybrid classical-quantum secret-sharing
scheme that shares a quantum secret among a set of players
such that only authorized groups can recover the secret and
unauthorized groups have no information about it. We
proved that for several access structures, this scheme can be
implemented with less quantum shares than in a conventional quantum secret-sharing scheme. Additionally, some
features of classical secret-sharing schemes, whose availability was not even known in the quantum domain, became
available. We did not address the robustness against noise
and/or cheating in the proposed protocol. Clearly, there is a
trade-off between the improvability of an access structure
and its robustness. If only one player holds the quantum
shares and if anything happens to this state, the secret will be
destroyed forever. We state the analysis of this problem as a
future research topic.
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